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IN DEFENSE OF NOT DEFENDING KANT’S RELIGION
Gordon E. Michalson, Jr.
This essay underscores the significant contribution Firestone and Jacobs 
make through the very thorough way their book surveys the wide range of 
recent scholarship bearing on Kant’s Religion. The essay then argues, how-
ever, that the complex scaffolding designed to summarize and categorize 
the varied responses to Kant has the effect of muting the authors’ own very 
bold interpretive stance. This point is particularly true with respect to their  
account of the compatibility of Kant’s Religion with the Christian tradition. 
In addition, the essay suggests that the judicial metaphor of “defense” is 
overplayed, forcing certain interpretations of Kant into potentially mislead-
ing positions for the sake of the interpretive scheme.
I
In a comment only a professor would make, theologian Hans Frei once 
said that Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason “is a book I 
would pack for a long stay on a desert island.”1 The obvious implication 
is that Kant’s book is a virtually inexhaustible source of interpretive pos-
sibilities to which one can return again and again, always discovering 
something fresh, new, and stimulating.
Interpretive developments associated with Kant’s Religion in recent 
decades amply reinforce Frei’s underlying point. In particular, since the 
publication of Allen Wood’s Kant’s Moral Religion in 1970,2 the world of 
English-speaking Kant scholarship has witnessed an impressive stream 
of individual works of interpretation of Kant’s religious thought, several 
anthologies of penetrating essays, countless journal articles, and two new 
translations of Religion itself. Perhaps the outstanding feature of the result-
ing dialogue is the wide range of viewpoints and the resulting absence of 
any clear interpretive consensus forming around one reading of Religion. 
Such a record suggests that Kant’s book is indeed an invitation to open-
ended debate, sustained by multiple interpretive interests.
1Hans W. Frei, Types of Christian Theology, ed. George Hunsinger and William C. Placher 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), 58.
2Allen W. Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1970). Wood’s most recent contribution to the matters at hand is “Kant and the Intelligibil-
ity of Evil” in Kant’s Anatomy of Evil ed. Sharon Anderson-Gold and Pablo Muchnik (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 144–172.
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Amidst these complexities, Chris Firestone and Nathan Jacobs have 
rendered the enormous service of identifying, clarifying, and evaluat-
ing a broad spectrum of these interpretative responses to Kant’s Religion. 
They undertake this already large task with the ultimate aim of advanc-
ing an ambitious interpretive program of their own. Whatever additional 
judgments one might make about In Defense of Kant’s Religion,3 the book’s 
value as a way of accessing and comparing varied interpretations of Reli-
gion is beyond question. It is just the sort of book one wants to put in the 
hands of students who are grappling with interpretive issues associated 
with Kant’s religious thought.
More importantly, Firestone and Jacobs integrate their taxonomy of in-
terpretive approaches to Kant’s text with their own sustained emphasis on 
at least three important points: the unity and argumentative coherence of 
Religion, the book’s consistency with the critical philosophy overall, and, 
finally, its general compatibility with a Christian theological result. The 
authors promote these important themes largely through the systematic 
development of resources in the critical philosophy and in Religion itself, 
including Kant’s notion of pure cognition, the two “experiments” Kant 
mentions in the Second Edition Preface of Religion, and his account of the 
moral disposition. They make the case that these features of Kant’s argu-
ment are present at the earliest stages of Religion and are crucial to keep 
in mind throughout in order to understand the text as a coherent work 
of philosophy of religion (6–7).4 Competently pursuing this ambitious 
agenda, Firestone and Jacobs have themselves added profitably to the 
range of interpretive options coming under a student’s scrutiny. The fact 
that, by my reading of their book, the authors believe that their approach 
eliminates or otherwise domesticates the most serious problems raised by 
other interpretations of Kant’s Religion simply underscores the ambition of 
their project. Coupled with this point is the fact that Firestone and Jacobs 
sustain welcome attention on Kant’s text itself, requiring those who may 
disagree with them to do the same.
In what follows, I want to structure my discussion in terms of a res-
ervation about IDKR that is perhaps really an indirect way of promoting 
my admiration for a cardinal feature of the authors’ position. There is a 
layered quality associated with their own positive assessment of Kant’s 
Religion, with some aspects of their position—such as their argument on 
behalf of the unity of the book—more specialized and technical in nature 
than others and of likely interest to fewer readers. But I think the feature 
3Chris L. Firestone and Nathan Jacobs, In Defense of Kant’s Religion (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008). Hereafter referred to as IDKR, with page 
numbers indicated in brackets within my text.
4The authors’ interest in understanding Religion in terms of its connections with the 
critical philosophy as a whole finds an interesting parallel in Pablo Muchnik’s recent effort 
to display the “systematic” importance within Kant’s overall philosophy of his theory of 
radical evil. Muchnik, Kant’s Theory of Evil: An Essay on the Dangers of Self-Love and the Aprio-
ricity of History (Lanham, MD.: Lexington Books, 2009).
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of their book that is at once the broadest and most arresting is their insis-
tence that, correctly understood, “the content of Kant’s arguments begins 
to look remarkably Christian” (5). To their credit, Firestone and Jacobs 
acknowledge that the relationship between Religion and Christianity is, in 
their words, “a mixed bag” (5). They also insist that their primary focus 
is on defending “the internal coherence of Religion” rather than on “com-
mending its desirability for Christianity” (6). Still, the authors clearly 
view Kant’s work as broadly compatible with Christianity and as a con-
structive moment in the history of modern Christian thought. Whatever 
their interpretive priorities may be, Firestone and Jacobs have an obvious 
stake in this presumed compatibility. By my reading of their book, this 
feature is the most significant way in which they stand over against much 
contemporary interpretation of Kant.
My reservation is that the authors underplay this aspect of their view 
of Kant’s Religion for the sake of other matters that are less significant. 
Indeed, their provocative interpretive thrust regarding Kant’s relation to 
Christianity is considerably obscured by the organizational complexities 
of IDKR. Notwithstanding the very real value associated with the can-
vassing of so many interpretive options, I find that the ultimate effect of 
so much organizational scaffolding is to detract from the interpretive in-
terests characterizing the book’s boldest elements. Since the authors’ aims 
are so provocative and interesting in and of themselves, they deserve a 
bolder presentation unencumbered by an organizational scheme that 
threatens to distract.
Embedded in this general reservation is the related fact that, as one 
whose own work figures prominently in IDKR, I do not always recognize 
my own position, insofar as I am depicted as the “star witness in the case 
against Religion” without ever having viewed my own efforts in a pros-
ecutorial mode (4). This point leaves me wondering if there is perhaps a 
second sense in which the organizational tactics of the book create unnec-
essary distraction, as commentators canvassed in the book (or those sym-
pathetic to them) focus on re-stating their own interpretive accounts rather 
than on facing squarely what Firestone and Jacobs have to say about Kant 
and Christianity. Certainly I find this tempting in my own case, as I surely 
never thought of myself as promoting a view against which Kant needs 
“defending.” Rather, my intention has always been to locate key issues in 
his thought that help us understand why he is so important for grasping the 
trajectory of modern religious thought in the West. Put more colloquially, 
I thought I was laying out in greater detail the case I’ve always made for 
Kant’s importance in the undergraduate survey course on modern religious 
thought that I’ve regularly taught since 1975. As one might sense from that 
originating context, my aim in part was to explain to restless students why 
we absolutely had to read this dry and difficult author before moving on to 
the more engaging writers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who 
had attracted the students to the course in the first place. I always viewed 
myself as the one making the case for Kant, not as the one prosecuting him.
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Perhaps ultimately at issue here is the extent to which the motif of a “de-
fense” of Kant has been deployed as a means of categorizing interpreters 
of Religion. While I certainly appreciate the tactical advantages provided 
by such an approach, the motif ultimately seems overdone, with too much 
diverse material forced into boxes for the sake of the scheme. Once again, 
a possible effect is to distract readers from the authors’ own bold interpre-
tive stance, leaving commentators responding to just about everything 
but what the authors take most seriously. In what follows, then, let me try 
to expand on these very general observations.
II
While some contrast with alternative approaches to Religion is obviously 
in order as a strategy for highlighting what is distinctive about these au-
thors’ views, the engagement with so many other interpreters is on such 
a scale that it threatens to take on a life of its own. We are introduced to a 
general breakdown between interpretive trends that are “principally neg-
ative toward religion and theology” and those trends that “affirm” religion 
and theology, with the former deemed the more “traditional” approach 
(1–2). In turn, these two broad categories result in further breakdowns 
among interpreters along lines suggested by the key problems concerning 
the “metaphysical motives behind Religion” and Religion’s “philosophical 
character.” These issues are then carefully explored by working through 
in detail those interpreters supposedly hostile to or otherwise critical of 
Kant’s efforts, followed by similar accounts of interpreters speaking up in 
“defense” of Kant. Two long chapters (chaps. 1–2) devoted to these themes 
are then followed by a chapter focusing on “seven core objections” to the 
“coherence” of Religion evidently raised by my own work. The remaining 
five chapters are then structured in ways that layer and commingle all of 
the interpretive options previously surveyed as the means of promoting 
the authors’ own constructive viewpoint—their “defense.”
This is a lot of balls to have in the air, particularly as a means, finally, 
of promoting a specific interpretive option. Perhaps inevitably, the sheer 
thoroughness of the authors’ account of alternative positions turns into an 
invitation to distraction from their own main points. The fact that virtu-
ally none of the panel discussion devoted to IDKR at the 2009 meeting of 
the American Academy of Religion was devoted to Firestone and Jacobs’s 
own constructive interpretation of Religion in Chapters 4–8 is suggestive 
of the element of distraction. As I have indicated, their primary aim is to 
underscore the argumentative coherence of Religion, with the latent as-
sociated aim of arguing its theological relevance as well. The canvassing 
of interpretive options is instrumental toward these ends. The element of 
distraction thus introduced by what is simply intended to be the set-up 
for the authors’ ultimate intention is the downside to the impressive com-
prehensiveness of their dissection of the secondary literature. In short, 
Firestone and Jacobs may provide their readers too many excuses to react 
to matters other than the ones they take most seriously.
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A good way to expand on this point is to ask: to what degree do the 
truly arresting features of the Firestone/Jacobs view of Religion depend for 
their clear depiction on the book’s complicated scaffolding? My answer is: 
for the most part, not much.
An example would be the astute analysis in Chapter 7 of the relation-
ship between an “individual” and a “corporate” account of moral regen-
eration. In very general terms, this issue concerns the extent to which 
Kant’s postulate of the immortality of the soul in the Critique of Practical 
Reason has been supplemented or perhaps even surpassed by his concept 
of the “ethical community” or commonwealth in Religion. That way of 
putting the matter illuminates the difference between an account of the 
perfection of virtue that is strictly individual in nature (the “duration” 
involved in Kant’s account of the immortality of the soul) and an account 
that is social or interpersonal in nature (the development within history 
of the ethical community).
In both cases, the thorny issue of moral conversion is at issue. Against 
the background of the desperate situation confronting the moral agent in 
the grip of a freely-chosen evil disposition—an evil, that is, that is “radi-
cal”—Kant’s depiction of moral conversion is as important for his overall 
position as it is complex in its rendering. In recent years, several inter-
preters have made an interesting case for the broader social frame of ref-
erence that the ethical community offers for understanding “progress” 
toward moral conversion and moral conversion itself.5 The implication 
is that corporate endeavor somehow succeeds in offsetting the debility 
associated with radical evil and becomes the locus of a rationally-based 
moral “hope.”6 Kant’s own explicit suggestion that God is the “lawgiver” 
of the ethical community7—an idea that Jerome Schneewind describes 
as Kant’s “astonishing claim” that we and God are moral partners8—un-
derscores the interesting shift potentially at stake as we move from a 
personal/individual to a corporate/social context for considering moral 
conversion.9 This approach implies an emerging fresh solution to the 
problem of moral conversion.
5E.g., Sharon Anderson-Gold, Unnecessary Evil: History and Moral Progress in the Philoso-
phy of Immanuel Kant (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001); Peter Byrne, 
The Moral Interpretation of Religion (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmann, 1998); Philip J. Rossi, 
S.J., The Social Authority of Reason: Kant’s Critique, Radical Evil, and the Destiny of Humankind 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005).
6This is the flip side of the question of the impact, if any, of the social dimension on 
the fall into radical evil, an issue that has recently been helpfully discussed by Jeanine M. 
Grenberg, “Social Dimensions of Kant’s Conception of Radical Evil,” in Anderson-Gold 
and Muchnik, Kant’s Anatomy, 173–194.
7Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, in Religion and Rational 
Theology, ed. A. W. Wood and G. di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 133–134.
8J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 512.
9Gordon E. Michalson, Jr., “God and Kant’s Ethical Commonwealth,” The Thomist 65 
(January 2001), 67–92.
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As one who is generally sympathetic with this shift to the social frame 
of reference—viewing it as Kant’s extended commentary on his own third 
version of the categorical imperative (“Every rational being must act as if 
he, by his maxims, were at all times a legislative member in the universal 
realm of ends”),10 I have to concede the importance of the Firestone/Jacobs 
rejoinder: “Prior to suggesting that humans must band together in pursuit 
of moral redemption . . . Kant must first establish that moral redemption 
is somehow possible” despite the debilitating effects of radical evil laid 
out in the same book (183). In other words, the sum-of-the-parts provided 
by the corporate perspective leaves unanswered the question of how a 
moral agent achieves moral regeneration. To assume otherwise may be 
to avoid the real issue by changing the subject. One is reminded here of 
Kierkegaard’s tavern owner who sold beer for a penny less than he paid 
for it. When asked how he remained solvent on that basis, he replied: “It’s 
the big number that does it.”11 Similarly, the shift from the individual to 
the corporate perspective may bring into view an important dimension of 
Kant’s concept of rational hope, but it does not finally address Kant’s own 
question concerning how “it is possible that a naturally evil human being 
should make himself into a good human being.”12
Firestone and Jacobs ultimately develop their position on the individu-
al vs. corporate perspective in ways closely associated with their aggres-
sively constructive view of Kant’s Christology, which is the locus of their 
provocative effort to read into Religion what they call a “prototypical the-
ology” (154–155). In a creative move, they fold together the issue of moral 
conversion and the themes of atonement and grace running through the 
authors’ depiction in the previous chapter of Jesus as the “prototype” of 
a moral disposition totally pleasing to God (chap. 6). Eventually supple-
mented in Chapter 8 by the authors’ strikingly positive view of Book Four 
of Religion, the interpretive result includes a transposition of Kant’s allu-
sions to the social or corporate dimension into a more significant role for 
ecclesiology to play than most other interpreters ascribe to Kant’s position. 
As these interpretive pieces fall serially into place, the authors provide a 
very interesting case for viewing Kant’s relation to revealed or historical 
religion in more positive terms than generally supposed—which is prob-
ably the sort of thing Nicholas Wolterstorff had in mind when he stated in 
his “Foreword” to IDKR that the Kant we meet in the pages of this book 
is a bit “strange” (xii).
In effect, then, Firestone and Jacobs have done something quite breath-
taking; they have provided what can only be called a revisionist account 
of Kant’s view of the relation between reason and revelation. This is a 
10See my discussion of this point in chaps. 4–5 of Kant and the Problem of God (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1999).
11A Kierkegaard Anthology, ed. Robert Bretall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1951), 438.
12Kant, Religion, 90.
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significant interpretive option warranting careful consideration by those 
who may disagree. My point here is not to debate its merits but simply to 
raise the question of whether or not the book’s complex organizational 
design is necessary to bring this significant point into the light of day—
or whether, instead, it partially obscures it. The issue, in other words, is 
whether or not the best parts of the book stand sufficiently free from the 
book’s organizational imperatives to be fully appreciated. By embedding 
their key points in so much interpretive give-and-take, Firestone and 
Jacobs potentially compromise their ability to give center stage to the 
leading features of their own position.
This specific instance is surely a reflection of the more comprehensive 
issue at stake here, which concerns Firestone and Jacobs’s view of Kant’s 
relationship to Christianity in general. Here they have some invariably 
controversial things to say. Indeed, even if their views on this matter are 
secondary to their interest in the unity of Religion, I find their position 
on Kant’s relation to Christianity to be the driving force associated with 
their most significant claims. This point comes through in their account 
of Book Four of Religion in Chapter 8, an account that is of particular in-
terest, since, as they point out, this is “the least studied Book of Religion” 
(210). Most commentators assume that Book Four is where Kant whittles 
away at religious zealotry, pseudo-worship of God, and enthusiastic 
excess in further defense of his rather austere moral/rationalist undertak-
ing—something of a mop-up operation that kills off the lingering targets 
following the work of the previous three Books. Firestone and Jacobs offer 
a more constructive viewpoint, linked with their fresh approach to the 
so-called “experiments” in terms of which Kant depicts the aims of Reli-
gion in the Second Edition Preface, and also with their effort to depict the 
“prototypical theology” emerging especially from the aggressive reading 
of Kant’s discussion of Jesus as the moral prototype. Here, their under-
lying effort to show that Kant’s Religion is “not only coherent, but also 
religiously and theologically affirmative” (233), stakes out the interpretive 
ground that in my view matters the most. Once again, I simply raise the 
question of whether or not so much organizational complexity is neces-
sary to bring the authors’ most substantive points into view, or if instead 
the complexity compromises this very effort.
III
I indicated at the outset that the element of distraction associated with 
IDKR’s organizational scheme is perhaps compounded by the imperative 
to force so many interpretive options into a format dictated by judicial 
metaphors. I surely sense this problem with respect to the way my own 
work is deployed in the book. Before I pursue this point, let me state un-
ambiguously my deep appreciation for having my own attempts to write 
some clear things about complicated matters taken in a serious way and 
in such a generous spirit. On specific issues of interpretation, as well as in 
connection with my understanding of Religion taken as a whole, Firestone 
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and Jacobs have given me a great deal on which to reflect, including the 
issue of Kant’s Christology and the best way to read Book Four. Still, when 
I find myself characterized as the “prosecution’s star witness” (83) who 
“casts a shadow of suspicion over the argumentative specifics” of Kant’s 
Religion (6), I find myself recalling Belgian surrealist René Magritte who, 
whenever told what the “meaning” of one of his paintings was, report-
edly said: “You are more fortunate than I am.”13
My overall sense in the current case is that a certain amount of slippage 
has occurred between the idea that Kant needs defending from what I 
write about Religion and the idea that Firestone and Jacobs need defending, 
due to our differing interpretive aims. They are quite right in depicting 
my approach to Kant’s account of radical evil and moral regeneration in 
terms of a “nest of tangles” riddled with “inconsistencies” that ultimately 
lead to a set of “wobbles” in Kant’s overall view of radical evil and moral 
recovery. As they correctly see, I argue that a pattern of wobbling emerges 
in connection with some truly key elements within Kant’s position.
For example, Kant claims that humankind has an “original predisposi-
tion to good” but a “natural propensity to evil,” that radical evil is “in-
nate” but “brought upon us by ourselves” through our freedom, that we 
are morally obligated to deliver ourselves from radical evil, even though 
it is “inextirpable by human powers,” and that we ourselves must “make 
ourselves” good again, but that divine aid “may be necessary” to our 
actually becoming good.14 To depict the cumulative effect of Kant’s posi-
tion in terms of “wobbling” may not be the most elegant way to address 
these complexities. However, the metaphor is designed to shed light, not 
simply on Kant’s position, but on the larger transitional issues suggested 
by Richard Rorty’s observation that “interesting philosophy is rarely an 
examination of the pros and cons of a thesis. Usually it is, implicitly or 
explicitly, a contest between an entrenched vocabulary which has become 
a nuisance and a half-formed new vocabulary which vaguely promises 
great things.”15 Kant’s is nothing if not “interesting philosophy,” and I am 
simply suggesting that something like the contest depicted by Rorty is at 
the source of the instability in Kant’s Religion, as Kant tries to reconcile his 
received biblical idiom with the emerging vocabulary of an autonomous 
rationality. In a rather rough sense, this is my way of understanding the 
cumbersome title of the book—a title that includes words like “reason” 
and “religion.”
Now I certainly have no problem with other commentators on Religion 
wanting to smooth out the tensions in Kant’s account for the sake of claim-
ing more stability for his position than I see. But at no point do I frame my 
13Suzi Gablik, Magritte (London: Thames and Hudson, 1970), 10.
14Gordon E. Michalson, Jr., Fallen Freedom: Kant on Radical Evil and Moral Regeneration 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 8.
15Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), 9
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own discussion in prosecutorial terms. Rather, I frame it in terms of my 
own clearly stated overall interpretive aim, which is to un-pack Kant’s posi-
tion as a telling indicator in the modern West’s search for a “substitute 
for supernaturalism” in the account of transcendence and divine action. 
In my view, Kant’s emphasis on human autonomy is his version of that 
very search. Put differently, I’m attempting to view Kant through the lens 
of a certain thought experiment, which is to consider “the history of reli-
gious thought in the West since about 1750 as an ongoing referendum on 
the idea of ‘otherworldliness.’”16 Kant’s own vote in that referendum is, in 
my view, particularly telling for the light it sheds on subsequent religious 
thought, as modern religious thinkers strive to reconcile continuity with 
biblical tradition with intelligibility within the context of modernity. In 
the end, my aim is to illustrate his influence on this challenging mediating 
effort and not to “malign” Kant’s text “because of its supposed incoher-
ence,” as the authors put it (232).
After all, viewed historically, the element of instability in, say, Kant’s 
account of moral regeneration—with its peculiar mixture of human and 
divine elements—is not argumentatively problematic so much as it is richly 
and powerfully suggestive. Far from concluding that Kant has fallen into 
a set of gross argumentative inconsistencies requiring a defense of his 
position, I argue that his position is momentously telling for the way it 
indicates deep transitions within the culture, as he tries to do justice to his 
own preferred vocabulary of rationality and autonomy while constrained 
within his historical setting by biblical patterns of thinking about human 
destiny. “Wobbling,” in his case, does not constitute what Firestone and 
Jacobs refer to as a “bleak state of affairs” requiring defense (105). Instead, 
it is an indicator of something at once deeper and far more important, re-
quiring historical understanding rather than an interpretive straitjacket—
not unlike the historical understanding that is required, say, to appreciate 
the French Impressionists’ experiments in painting what the eye actually 
sees rather than what the received tradition insists they should paint. As 
I put the matter in Fallen Freedom:
Kant’s problem is that the emergent new sensibility is seriously compro-
mised by a received tradition largely antithetical to it: he is not dealing with 
philosophical argumentation so much as he is juggling centuries. This is 
why it is not adequate to try to rehabilitate the doctrines of the Religion along 
purely conceptual and argumentative lines, as contemporary analytic philoso-
phers sometimes try to do with the doctrines of the first Critique.17
By contrast, Firestone and Jacobs concentrate precisely on the rehabili-
tation of the arguments within Religion, including a strenuous effort to 
demonstrate both their mutual consistency and their continuity with the 
critical philosophy as a whole. Certainly I am not totally uninterested in 
16Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 1.
17Ibid., 140, emphasis added.
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the arguments themselves, and I can see instances where Firestone and 
Jacobs deserve a response on the terms they have laid out before us. None-
theless, my own effort is more accurately viewed as an invitation to reflect 
on the wider perspective implied by my characterization of Kant as a cul-
tural way-station between Luther and Marx within the West’s ongoing 
referendum on supernaturalism and otherworldliness.
Perhaps another way of making this point is to draw on the difference 
between “argument” and “sensibility.” In depicting difficulties within 
Religion, I am not making a case for the book’s failure but, rather, suggest-
ing that the book marks a transitional moment in a change in sensibility, 
not altogether unlike the change in sensibility conveyed by my allusion 
to French Impressionism. From my standpoint, Firestone and Jacobs’s at-
tempts to “defend” Kant by showing both the coherence of Religion and 
its broad compatibility with traditional Christianity is rather like an art 
historian trying to argue for the compatibility of Manet’s breakthrough 
with the earlier tradition of representational art. As I have put the mat-
ter elsewhere, the difference here between “argument” and “sensibility” 
means that the instability affecting Kant’s Religion is not something he 
“could ever have ‘corrected,’ but only lived through.”18 Even less, then, 
is the instability the sort of thing against which he needs “defending.” 
Consequently, to view my attempt at historical contextualizing as a pros-
ecutorial gesture takes on the appearance of a co-opting gesture made for 
the sake of the requirements of the courtroom drama.
It should be clear by now that the chief difference between Firestone 
and Jacobs and me ultimately concerns the issue of Kant’s relation to the 
trajectory of modern Christian thought. This overarching issue is more 
fundamental to our differences than our particular approaches to this 
or that individual textual issue in Religion. Firestone and Jacobs are also 
more focused on the text of Religion viewed as a series of arguments that, 
in their view, culminate in a unified account, rather than on Kant viewed 
as symptomatic of larger issues. I was more explicit in clarifying my con-
trasting aims in the book following my study of radical evil, on which 
Firestone and Jacobs concentrate the most attention, but the aims in both 
cases were roughly the same. As I put it in the subsequent book, the proj-
ect was not designed as a “technical specialized work intended mainly for 
fellow members of the Kant guild,” nor was it intended to be an “intro-
ductory text.” Instead, it fell into a third category, that of studies designed 
“to relate Kant to some broader interpretive theme in our philosophical, 
religious, or cultural history.”19 I viewed that book as an extension of my 
interest in the interplay between the human and divine, framed now in 
terms of Kant’s supposed relationship to the liberal tradition of Protestant 
mediating theology.
18Ibid., 141.
19Michalson, Kant and the Problem of God, vii.
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Once again, the aim was not to prosecute Kant but to depict his com-
plicated role in a similarly complicated story extending far beyond the 
boundaries of his own thought. To the extent that my rendering of his role 
is inaccurate due to specific textual issues on which Firestone and Jacobs 
offer a compelling corrective, I am surely open to correction. I simply take 
issue with the notion that Kant needs “defending” from my modest efforts 
to clarify his place in that larger story. Nor, so far as I can tell, does my 
account involve any stake whatsoever in an issue of obviously consider-
able importance to Firestone and Jacobs, which concerns the degree of 
unity of the text of Religion.
IV
A possible implication of my reservations about the way my own work 
is characterized by Firestone and Jacobs is that they simply overplay the 
entire motif of a “defense” of Kant. I can well appreciate an attempt, say, 
to rehabilitate a Kantian account of a specific technical issue that has 
garnered criticism, such as the apparent incompatibility of claiming that 
radical evil is both “innate” and “freely” elected. But to structure an entire 
narrative in terms of the motif of “defense” can produce a tendency to give 
a more pejorative and adversarial edge to interpretive efforts that may 
have been originally intended only to reveal what might otherwise re-
main hidden in the text or otherwise unacknowledged for lack of a broader 
historical context. Given the large number of interpreters canvassed by 
Firestone and Jacobs, it is no doubt true in a given instance or two that the 
interpreter’s intent is indeed to criticize Kant for a serious argumentative 
flaw or for a convoluted overall position. Still, when so many interpreters 
are invoked in order to provide content to the courtroom in which the 
defense is argued, there will inevitably be subtle warping effects as com-
mentaries not designed for prosecutorial purposes are forced to conform 
to the framework.
Worse, the power of the judicial motif is such that it deputizes Firestone 
and Jacobs to remove important voices from the courtroom altogether. 
When a Kant interpreter as profound as Yirmiahu Yovel is barred from 
testifying at the outset simply on the grounds that he is a “hostile wit-
ness” who is not “welcome at the hearing,” (4) alarm bells invariably go 
off, and one gets the uneasy feeling that arguments most challenging to 
the authors’ central aim are simply eliminated by fiat. The case of Yovel 
is telling, because the reason he is viewed as a “hostile witness” is not 
that he disputes the unity or coherence of Religion. Rather, he is expelled 
because Firestone and Jacobs take Yovel to be saying that Kant has noth-
ing “positive or constructive to say about historical faith,” which means 
that for Yovel “Religion is essentially ‘destructive’ to revealed religion” (4). 
One might observe that, if this serious possibility has been eliminated at 
the outset, then the more positive assessment of Kant’s view of revealed 
religion embraced by Firestone and Jacobs is virtually assured. The more 
important point, however, is that the response to Yovel vividly brings to 
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the surface the authors’ deep stake in a certain view of Kant’s relation to 
Christianity, with the accompanying possibility that this issue is finally 
more determinative for them than the less loaded issue of the internal 
coherence of Religion.
Finally, I suppose it says something about the current case that there 
seems to be a long tradition of thinking that Kant needs defending. In 
his recent life of Kant, Manfred Kuehn reminds us of the biography of 
Kant rushed into print in the very year of his death by his friend and col-
league, Ludwig Ernst Borowski. In partial explanation of the speed with 
which the biography was produced, Kuehn observes that Borowski’s book 
“at times takes the form of a defense” of his colleague.20 It was a defense 
against accusations of impiety driven by “Kant’s reputation as an unbe-
liever” in his home city.21 Drawing on contemporary recollections, Kuehn 
claims that there were those who “had often heard Kant scoff at prayer 
and other religious practices. Organized religion filled him with ire. It 
was clear to anyone who knew Kant personally that he had no faith in a 
personal God.”22 Borowski himself evidently had his own reservations 
about Kant’s religious views—to the point where he skipped Kant’s fu-
neral—yet his biography took pains to show that Kant himself “was noth-
ing like his work” and that “even his work, if properly understood, was not 
as detrimental to the Christian religion as it may appear.”23
In thus carrying forward the tradition of defending Kant’s religious 
outlook, Firestone and Jacobs have implicitly made the case for the com-
patibility of Kant’s Religion with Christianity in ways warranting detailed 
responses from those who see matters differently. I admire their achieve-
ment and look forward to the further discussions their work will inevi-
tably generate. Yet I would still press the point that the fact that their 
view of Religion may go against the grain of much Kant scholarship is 
hardly the same thing as claiming that Kant needs defending. Scholars 
are obviously free to write the books they choose to write and not be 
second-guessed by their readers. At the end of the day, however, “defend-
ing” Kant simply strikes me as analogous to “defending” Shakespeare—I 
suppose you could do it, but the effort is rather like trying to protect Mt. 
Rushmore from the rain with a sheet. Regardless of the success or failure 
of your efforts, the monument will remain standing there in all its glory, 
utterly undiminished.
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